Research on Self-Deception: Intentionalism vs. Non-intentionalism
Section: Articles
Abstract
There are two ways to define self-deception, which are intentionalists' approach and non-intentionalists' approach. As an intentioanalist, Davidson emphasizes self-deception is intentional, and describes it as an interpersonal-deception. Intentioanalists claim that human mind can be divided into different self-nets, and we should use irrational mental causation to explain self-deception. Non-intentionalists argue against the model of interpersonal deception, and also argue against that self-deception is intentional. Mele treats self-deception as a phenomenon of human cognition, and regards it as a kind of non-autonomy. After Mele, the debates of self-deception have reached a new level. But the new opinions seem to have issues of themselves. And if we introduce some theories of self-knowledge, it may be helpful for both the intentionalists and Non-intentionalists to handle their problem.
This article compares competing philosophical accounts of self-deception and explores how debates on intentionalism bear on agency, rationality, and moral psychology.