The Metaphysical Foundations of Rawls's Moral Constructivism
Section: Articles
Abstract
Rawls's moral constructivism is a basic theoretical method that emphasizes both objectivity and subjectivity. It argues that ethical norms are constructed by subjects within a rational procedure and under necessary initial conditions, so that norms are realized as the outcome of the procedure rather than deduced in advance. This implies that moral constructivism lowers the status of ethical theories that rely on the epistemic completeness of realism. It further holds that moral norms should be understood as the constructed result of the categorical imperative procedure, and that this procedure is possible because the human subject possesses a distinctive metaphysical characteristic: reflectivity. In this context, reflectivity integrates the mind's self-referentiality, purposiveness, absolute spontaneity, and living spirituality, thereby becoming at once theoretical and practical, conceptualist and German idealist. The core of constructivism, and of reflectivity itself, is manifested in Kant's account of the fact of reason, through which an almost scientific mode of representation seeks to unify ideality and living spirituality.
This article examines the metaphysical assumptions that underwrite Rawlsian moral constructivism and situates the argument within contemporary normative theory.