Tag: AI

Pages tagged with AI.

  • What Makes Halt Possible? The Significance for AGI of a Halt Mechanism with the Data "Market" as an External Constraint
    August 9, 2023 · lectures

    A seminar lecture examining why halt remains a central problem for AGI, with particular attention to the idea of a halt mechanism constrained by a data market as an external condition.

  • A Specialized NARS-P2P Consensus Network Model: An "Anti-Jitter" AGI Community
    December 25, 2021 · lectures

    A conference presentation on a specialized NARS-P2P consensus network model and its implications for building an "anti-jitter" AGI community.

  • The Significance of the Second-Person Perspective for Humanoid AI: Emulation, Simulation, and Imitation
    December 13, 2020 · lectures

    A conference presentation on the significance of the second-person perspective for humanoid AI, focusing on the conceptual differences among emulation, simulation, and imitation.

  • Limits of AI Moral Enhancement
    January 1, 2019 · lectures

    A representative conference presentation on the ethical limits of AI-based moral enhancement and the philosophical assumptions that shape enhancement debates.

  • An Ethical Analysis of Moral Enhancement: A Free-Will Perspective
    publications

    Moral bioenhancement (MB) is the use of biomedical technology to improve people's moral cognitive ability and enable them to achieve certain moral purposes. On the basis of the bioconservative thesis, one major criticism of MB is that it would undermine people's "freedom to fall," but this objection may itself lead critics into difficulty. In response, we replace "freedom to fall" with "alternative possibility," while noting that supporters of MB can still avoid falsification by adopting a compatibilist position. Starting from a new moral-conservative perspective informed by Dennett's theory of the evolution of consciousness representation, this paper argues that supporters of MB will ultimately fall into the paradox of "MB uselessness" and the "abolition of the moral meaning of direct human conscious control."

  • Cyberpunk and Cypherpunk: A Philosophical Analysis Comparing Two Views of the Metaverse
    publications

    As ancestors of the idea of the metaverse - Cyberpunks and Cypherpunks - propose two distinct attitudes towards Cyberspace, and this difference also infuses their attitudes towards the metaverse. These two attitudes will powerfully influence the developmental direction of the metaverse and how it will be recognized and accepted by society. Given that the visual space is an artificial reality created by technology, they not only illustrate two different ideas regarding "realities other than the physical one of human society", but also illustrate two different ideas regarding technology itself. The Cyberpunk view of the metaverse could be seen as techno-pessimistic or Luddism. Cypherpunk's metaverse view, on the other hand, is "technological transformationism", which carries multi-possibilities of living styles of human being, and it almost incompatible with Luddism.

  • Limits of AI Moral Enhancement
    publications

    Artificial intelligence moral enhancement is a sub-topic subordinate to the "human moral enhancement" trend. It is hoped that human moral cognition can be improved through the "artificial moral advisor (AMA)", which is capable of "objective" moral representation and strong information acquisition. However, since AMA cannot meet the "ideal observer (IO)" standard after all, it will inevitably fall into the embarrassment of expertism. In addition, researchers who resort to the construction of "moral machines" also presuppose an IO perspective by constructing learning algorithmic frameworks for automatic ethical classification and decision making. Through the experimental study of Guarini's Moral Case Classifier (MCC), we have found that the hypothetical function without pre-classification could not be fitted, which means that the generalist AMA that fits the IO cannot be built. In view of this, we propose another different "AI moral enhancement" scheme - an "AMA as The Other", and hope that the artificial general intelligence (AGI) will become the basis for its realization.

  • The Second-Person Standpoint and Moral Machine
    publications

    Given the need for Human-Machine moral Interaction, an AI system that focuses on moral theory involving intersubjectivity is worthy of attention. We will build a network knowledge representation framework based on the second-person standpoint moral theory to analyze the design philosophy of a general artificial intelligence (AGI) moral machine. We then use this framework to investigate an interactive moral machine designed by Bello and Bringsjord (2013). In constructing a feature of mindreading, their study faces philosophical challenges to combine the empirical source configuration of its inheritance function and the multi-world setting of the Polyscheme itself. We try to prove that the integrated structure of the Polyscheme based on a third-person perspective, multi-world setting cannot afford a continuous self that can accommodate enough diversity of the stimulation relationship between the concept of self and other. Moreover, we suggest that the psychological distance structure of mindreading should mainly come from the internal "self" of the system. This requires the system to have an intrinsic kernel, meaning a design philosophy completely different from the integrated style of Polyscheme.

  • The Significance of a Second-Person Perspective for the Development of Humanoid AI
    publications

    Anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism are a pair of basic directions in cognitive science and AI research. These directions correspond respectively to "first person" and "third person". The confrontation between these two concepts not only has guiding significance for the exploration of cognitive science but also has ethical importance. Human-like AI (for instance, Artificial General Intelligence, AGI for short) research hovers between them. I propose a second-person, or limited consensus perspective as a philosophical and ethical research context that is integrated with the first and third person to constitute a "trinity" relationship - what I call the "trinity of the contexts of intelligent artificiality", which could be represented by the relationship between emulation, simulation, and imitation. The consequences of the general loss of the first-person context will be explored, including the uncertainty of the ethical landscape of humankind - such as the fragmentation of the self - and the risk of going against the original intention of AGI research. This cannot be fixed by returning to a first-person perspective. The second-person context is an idea that is situated between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, and it may be employed to avoid these risks.

  • The War of Autonomous Driving: Computer Vision and LiDAR
    publications

    This article analyzes the technical and conceptual debate between computer vision and LiDAR in the development of autonomous driving systems. It argues that the disagreement is not merely about engineering preference, but about competing assumptions concerning perception, safety, and the future trajectory of intelligent mobility.