Tag: Cognitive Science
Pages tagged with cognitive science.
- Empathy as a Second-Person Standpoint / 作为第二人称观点的同理心
Part I of this bilingual series, adapted from *Life-Care Education Based on Improved Mental Models*, Chapter 8, Section 1. The English column is an AI translation revised for student readers; this part focuses on empathy, Hume, Singer, and the case for a second-person account.
- Positive Psychology and Caring Practice / 积极心理学与关怀实践
Part VI of this bilingual series, adapted from *Life-Care Education Based on Improved Mental Models*, Chapter 8, Section 6. The English column is an AI translation revised for student readers; this part links care education to action, resilience, self-interpretation, and positive psychology.
- The Significance of the Second-Person Perspective for Humanoid AI: Emulation, Simulation, and Imitation
A conference presentation on the significance of the second-person perspective for humanoid AI, focusing on the conceptual differences among emulation, simulation, and imitation.
- Research on Self-Deception: Intentionalism vs. Non-intentionalism
There are two ways to define self-deception, which are intentionalists' approach and non-intentionalists' approach. As an intentioanalist, Davidson emphasizes self-deception is intentional, and describes it as an interpersonal-deception. Intentioanalists claim that human mind can be divided into different self-nets, and we should use irrational mental causation to explain self-deception. Non-intentionalists argue against the model of interpersonal deception, and also argue against that self-deception is intentional. Mele treats self-deception as a phenomenon of human cognition, and regards it as a kind of non-autonomy. After Mele, the debates of self-deception have reached a new level. But the new opinions seem to have issues of themselves. And if we introduce some theories of self-knowledge, it may be helpful for both the intentionalists and Non-intentionalists to handle their problem.
- The Second-Person Standpoint and Moral Machine
Given the need for Human-Machine moral Interaction, an AI system that focuses on moral theory involving intersubjectivity is worthy of attention. We will build a network knowledge representation framework based on the second-person standpoint moral theory to analyze the design philosophy of a general artificial intelligence (AGI) moral machine. We then use this framework to investigate an interactive moral machine designed by Bello and Bringsjord (2013). In constructing a feature of mindreading, their study faces philosophical challenges to combine the empirical source configuration of its inheritance function and the multi-world setting of the Polyscheme itself. We try to prove that the integrated structure of the Polyscheme based on a third-person perspective, multi-world setting cannot afford a continuous self that can accommodate enough diversity of the stimulation relationship between the concept of self and other. Moreover, we suggest that the psychological distance structure of mindreading should mainly come from the internal "self" of the system. This requires the system to have an intrinsic kernel, meaning a design philosophy completely different from the integrated style of Polyscheme.
- The Significance of a Second-Person Perspective for the Development of Humanoid AI
Anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism are a pair of basic directions in cognitive science and AI research. These directions correspond respectively to "first person" and "third person". The confrontation between these two concepts not only has guiding significance for the exploration of cognitive science but also has ethical importance. Human-like AI (for instance, Artificial General Intelligence, AGI for short) research hovers between them. I propose a second-person, or limited consensus perspective as a philosophical and ethical research context that is integrated with the first and third person to constitute a "trinity" relationship - what I call the "trinity of the contexts of intelligent artificiality", which could be represented by the relationship between emulation, simulation, and imitation. The consequences of the general loss of the first-person context will be explored, including the uncertainty of the ethical landscape of humankind - such as the fragmentation of the self - and the risk of going against the original intention of AGI research. This cannot be fixed by returning to a first-person perspective. The second-person context is an idea that is situated between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, and it may be employed to avoid these risks.