Tag: Free Will

• An Ethical Analysis of Moral Enhancement: A Free-Will Perspective
  publications

  Moral bioenhancement (MB) is the use of biomedical technology to improve people's moral cognitive ability and enable them to achieve certain moral purposes. On the basis of the bioconservative thesis, one major criticism of MB is that it would undermine people's "freedom to fall," but this objection may itself lead critics into difficulty. In response, we replace "freedom to fall" with "alternative possibility," while noting that supporters of MB can still avoid falsification by adopting a compatibilist position. Starting from a new moral-conservative perspective informed by Dennett's theory of the evolution of consciousness representation, this paper argues that supporters of MB will ultimately fall into the paradox of "MB uselessness" and the "abolition of the moral meaning of direct human conscious control."

• Research on Self-Deception: Intentionalism vs. Non-intentionalism
  publications

  There are two ways to define self-deception, which are intentionalists' approach and non-intentionalists' approach. As an intentioanalist, Davidson emphasizes self-deception is intentional, and describes it as an interpersonal-deception. Intentioanalists claim that human mind can be divided into different self-nets, and we should use irrational mental causation to explain self-deception. Non-intentionalists argue against the model of interpersonal deception, and also argue against that self-deception is intentional. Mele treats self-deception as a phenomenon of human cognition, and regards it as a kind of non-autonomy. After Mele, the debates of self-deception have reached a new level. But the new opinions seem to have issues of themselves. And if we introduce some theories of self-knowledge, it may be helpful for both the intentionalists and Non-intentionalists to handle their problem.